fix(prefs): recover a preference store whose bytes are not valid UTF-8

`File.readAsString` reports a UTF-8 decode failure as a FileSystemException,
not a FormatException, so three guards written for that case never ran. The
preflight's `on FormatException` branch was unreachable and its
`on FileSystemException` sibling waved the document through; the plugin then
threw the same FileSystemException, which failed the FormatException/TypeError
test that decides repairability; and quarantine's lossy-decode fallback sat
dead behind a rethrow. A store with one bad high byte — a UTF-16 BOM, a stray
0x80 — therefore reached the user as a failure screen with no Repair button
and no way forward at all.

Read bytes and decode explicitly instead, at both sites. Classification moves
into describeStoreDamage, so a failure that surfaces after the preflight
passed is judged by re-reading the file rather than by the error's type: a
denied or locked store is indistinguishable from a decode failure by type or
message, and offering a destructive repair for a permissions problem would
reset every setting and risk the vault key over something a chmod fixes.
isCorruptStoreError went with it, having no remaining callers.

A repair that quarantines the store and then cannot reopen it no longer
strands the process either. The repaired future was built straight from the
cache loader, bypassing the self-healing reset sharedCache installs, so a
failed reopen parked a rejected future in _cacheFuture and every later attempt
replayed that stale error — with the damaged file already moved aside, so a
restart would have booted cleanly.

CorruptPreferenceStoreException now carries reopenSafe and a derived,
content-free shape: byte length, whether it decoded, whether every byte is
zero. #1732 arrived as "FormatException at offset 0" and nothing else, which
cannot separate an all-zero file from a non-JSON first character from bytes
that are not UTF-8; these can, and never quote the document.

Cover the loop against the real desktop backend rather than a fake.
shared_preferences_linux is pure Dart, byte-identical to the Windows
implementation, and exposes fs/pathProvider, so pointing it at a temp
directory exercises the genuine read, parse, cache and write path on any host
— the join between preflight, classification and reopen where every one of
these defects lived, and which had no coverage at all.
This commit is contained in:
edde746
2026-08-01 06:59:20 +02:00
parent 3509f4b989
commit 3ae7aa554b
7 changed files with 517 additions and 48 deletions
@@ -93,12 +93,19 @@ abstract class BaseSharedPreferencesService {
try {
return await _openSharedCache();
} catch (error, stackTrace) {
if (!PrefsRecovery.isCorruptStoreError(error)) rethrow;
// The preflight accepted this document and the plugin still rejected it,
// so it has now cached something we cannot reason about. Repair can
// The preflight accepted this document and the plugin still rejected it.
// Classify by re-reading the bytes, never by the error's type: the
// desktop backends surface a UTF-8 decode failure as a
// `FileSystemException`, which is indistinguishable from a denied or
// locked file, and a permission error must never be offered a
// destructive repair. A null result means the document on disk is fine,
// so whatever went wrong keeps its own type and its own path.
final damage = await PrefsRecovery.describeCurrentStoreDamage(reopenSafe: false);
if (damage == null) rethrow;
// The plugin has now cached something we cannot reason about. Repair can
// still quarantine the file, but the process has to restart afterwards.
appLogger.e('Preference store could not be parsed', error: error, stackTrace: stackTrace);
throw CorruptPreferenceStoreException(error, stackTrace, reopenSafe: false);
throw damage;
}
}
@@ -159,13 +166,24 @@ abstract class BaseSharedPreferencesService {
}
_cacheFuture = null;
final repaired = _cacheLoader().then((cache) async {
late final Future<SharedPreferencesWithCache> repaired;
repaired = _cacheLoader()
.then((cache) async {
final vaultKey = salvaged.vaultKey;
if (vaultKey != null) await cache.setString(credentialVaultKeyPref, vaultKey);
for (final entry in salvaged.sessions.entries) {
await cache.setString(entry.key, entry.value);
}
return cache;
})
.onError<Object>((error, stackTrace) {
// The same self-healing reset `sharedCache` installs, for the same
// reason. Without it a reopen that fails *after* the store was
// already quarantined would leave a permanently rejected future in
// `_cacheFuture`, and every later retry would replay that stale error
// for the rest of the process — with the on-disk cause already gone.
if (identical(_cacheFuture, repaired)) _cacheFuture = null;
Error.throwWithStackTrace(error, stackTrace);
});
_cacheFuture = repaired;
await repaired;
+111 -34
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,39 @@ const String prefsStoreFileName = 'shared_preferences.json';
/// spelling until the legacy-to-async migration has copied them across.
const String legacyKeyPrefix = 'flutter.';
/// Derived, content-free description of a damaged store's bytes.
///
/// Every field is a measurement, never a quotation: a length, and two
/// booleans. Together they separate the shapes that all surface as
/// "FormatException at offset 0" — an all-zero file, a document with a
/// non-JSON first character, bytes that are not UTF-8 at all — which the
/// message alone cannot (#1732).
class PrefsStoreShape {
const PrefsStoreShape({required this.length, required this.validUtf8, required this.allZero});
factory PrefsStoreShape.of(List<int> bytes) => PrefsStoreShape(
length: bytes.length,
validUtf8: _decodesAsUtf8(bytes),
allZero: bytes.isNotEmpty && bytes.every((byte) => byte == 0),
);
final int length;
final bool validUtf8;
final bool allZero;
static bool _decodesAsUtf8(List<int> bytes) {
try {
utf8.decode(bytes);
return true;
} on FormatException {
return false;
}
}
@override
String toString() => '$length bytes, ${validUtf8 ? 'valid' : 'invalid'} UTF-8${allZero ? ', every byte zero' : ''}';
}
/// Raised when the preference store exists but cannot be parsed.
///
/// `BaseSharedPreferencesService` converts the platform's raw
@@ -38,10 +71,10 @@ const String legacyKeyPrefix = 'flutter.';
/// offset. Anything holding that object could persist, render or upload raw
/// credential material — `credential_vault_key_v1`, a tracker refresh token, a
/// Seerr cookie — and at this point in startup `LogRedactionManager` has no
/// registered values to catch it. Only the cause's type and offset survive,
/// both of which are safe by construction.
/// registered values to catch it. Only the cause's type, offset and the
/// derived [PrefsStoreShape] survive, all of which are safe by construction.
class CorruptPreferenceStoreException implements Exception {
CorruptPreferenceStoreException(Object cause, this.causeStackTrace, {this.reopenSafe = true})
CorruptPreferenceStoreException(Object cause, this.causeStackTrace, {this.reopenSafe = true, this.shape})
: causeType = cause.runtimeType.toString(),
offset = cause is FormatException ? cause.offset : null;
@@ -64,10 +97,14 @@ class CorruptPreferenceStoreException implements Exception {
/// A repair in that state must be followed by a restart.
final bool reopenSafe;
/// Measurements of the rejected bytes, when they were available.
final PrefsStoreShape? shape;
@override
String toString() =>
'CorruptPreferenceStoreException: the preference store could not be parsed'
' ($causeType${offset == null ? '' : ' at offset $offset'})';
' ($causeType${offset == null ? '' : ' at offset $offset'};'
' ${shape ?? 'shape unavailable'}; reopenSafe: $reopenSafe)';
}
/// Raised when a credential preference exists but its stored type no longer
@@ -160,18 +197,18 @@ class SalvagedPrefsCredentials {
/// user an explicit choice that names the real cost, and only an accepted
/// choice reaches `BaseSharedPreferencesService.repairCorruptStore`.
abstract final class PrefsRecovery {
/// Whether [error] means the store is present but unparseable, as opposed to
/// missing, inaccessible, or a plugin failure.
///
/// `shared_preferences_windows` throws `FormatException` from `json.decode`
/// on a truncated file and `TypeError` from `Map<String, Object>.from` when
/// a decoded value is null.
static bool isCorruptStoreError(Object error) => error is FormatException || error is TypeError;
/// Whether a repair can be attempted on this platform. Only the desktop
/// implementations use a single JSON file we can salvage and quarantine;
/// Android, iOS and macOS delegate to platform-native stores.
static bool get isSupportedPlatform => Platform.isWindows || Platform.isLinux;
static bool get isSupportedPlatform => _supportedPlatformOverride ?? (Platform.isWindows || Platform.isLinux);
static bool? _supportedPlatformOverride;
/// Test seam. The desktop store path is Windows/Linux only, so a host suite
/// running anywhere else cannot reach the production preflight at all — and
/// that preflight is precisely where #1732 is decided.
@visibleForTesting
static void debugSetSupportedPlatformOverride(bool? value) => _supportedPlatformOverride = value;
static Future<File> storeFile() async {
final directory = await getApplicationSupportDirectory();
@@ -194,51 +231,94 @@ abstract final class PrefsRecovery {
/// No-op on the platforms that use a native store, and on a missing store —
/// a first launch has nothing to validate.
static Future<void> assertStoreReadable({File? storeFileOverride}) async {
if (storeFileOverride == null && !isSupportedPlatform) return;
final damage = await describeCurrentStoreDamage(reopenSafe: true, storeFileOverride: storeFileOverride);
if (damage != null) throw damage;
}
/// Re-reads the live store and classifies it, without throwing.
///
/// Returns null when the bytes on disk are ones the desktop backends can
/// hold — including a missing or unreadable file, neither of which a repair
/// addresses. A non-null result means the *document* is damaged, which is
/// the only thing that justifies offering the user a destructive repair.
///
/// Used both as the preflight and, with `reopenSafe: false`, to classify a
/// failure that surfaced after the preflight already passed.
static Future<CorruptPreferenceStoreException?> describeCurrentStoreDamage({
required bool reopenSafe,
File? storeFileOverride,
}) async {
if (storeFileOverride == null && !isSupportedPlatform) return null;
final File file;
try {
file = storeFileOverride ?? await storeFile();
if (!await file.exists()) return;
if (!await file.exists()) return null;
} on Object {
// Locating or stat-ing the directory is a different failure entirely
// (missing/denied application support); let the plugin report it.
return;
return null;
}
final List<int> bytes;
try {
bytes = await file.readAsBytes();
} on FileSystemException {
return null; // Unreadable rather than invalid; not something a repair fixes.
}
return describeStoreDamage(bytes, reopenSafe: reopenSafe);
}
/// Classifies raw store bytes, returning the failure to surface or null when
/// the document is one the desktop backends can hold.
///
/// Byte-level on purpose. `File.readAsString` reports a UTF-8 decode failure
/// as a `FileSystemException`, indistinguishable by type from a denied or
/// locked file, so decoding explicitly here is the only way to tell a damaged
/// document apart from a file we simply cannot read (#1732).
@visibleForTesting
static CorruptPreferenceStoreException? describeStoreDamage(List<int> bytes, {bool reopenSafe = true}) {
final shape = PrefsStoreShape.of(bytes);
final String raw;
try {
raw = await file.readAsString();
} on FileSystemException {
return; // Unreadable rather than invalid; not something a repair fixes.
raw = utf8.decode(bytes);
} on FormatException catch (error, stackTrace) {
throw CorruptPreferenceStoreException(error, stackTrace); // Not UTF-8.
return CorruptPreferenceStoreException(error, stackTrace, reopenSafe: reopenSafe, shape: shape);
}
if (raw.isEmpty) return;
// Both desktop backends skip `json.decode` for an empty document and start
// from `{}`, so an empty store is a first launch, not damage.
if (raw.isEmpty) return null;
final Object? decoded;
try {
decoded = jsonDecode(raw);
} on FormatException catch (error, stackTrace) {
throw CorruptPreferenceStoreException(error, stackTrace);
return CorruptPreferenceStoreException(error, stackTrace, reopenSafe: reopenSafe, shape: shape);
}
if (decoded is! Map) {
throw CorruptPreferenceStoreException(
return CorruptPreferenceStoreException(
const FormatException('Preference store is not a JSON object'),
StackTrace.current,
reopenSafe: reopenSafe,
shape: shape,
);
}
for (final entry in decoded.entries) {
if (entry.key is! String || !_isStorableValue(entry.value)) {
// The key name is safe to omit and the value must never be quoted, so
// the exception deliberately carries neither.
throw CorruptPreferenceStoreException(
return CorruptPreferenceStoreException(
const FormatException('Preference store holds a value of an unsupported type'),
StackTrace.current,
reopenSafe: reopenSafe,
shape: shape,
);
}
}
return null;
}
/// Mirrors what the desktop backends can hold: the JSON scalars plus a
@@ -381,16 +461,13 @@ abstract final class PrefsRecovery {
return (salvaged: SalvagedPrefsCredentials.empty, backupPath: null);
}
String raw;
try {
raw = await file.readAsString();
} on FileSystemException {
rethrow;
} on FormatException {
// Not valid UTF-8 either; a lossy read still exposes the ASCII-only
// credential entries to the salvage pass.
raw = const Utf8Decoder(allowMalformed: true).convert(await file.readAsBytes());
}
// Read bytes and decode lossily rather than calling `readAsString`, which
// surfaces a UTF-8 decode failure as a `FileSystemException` and would
// abort the repair on exactly the damaged store it exists to rescue. For a
// well-formed document this is identical to a strict decode; for a damaged
// one it still exposes the ASCII credential entries to the salvage pass.
// A genuine read failure propagates — that is not something a repair fixes.
final raw = const Utf8Decoder(allowMalformed: true).convert(await file.readAsBytes());
final salvaged = salvage(raw);
+2 -2
View File
@@ -845,7 +845,7 @@ packages:
source: hosted
version: "2.6.0"
path_provider_linux:
dependency: transitive
dependency: "direct dev"
description:
name: path_provider_linux
sha256: "58c2005f147315b11e9b4a7bc889cd5203e250cba8e3f012dae259b4972b5c16"
@@ -1100,7 +1100,7 @@ packages:
source: hosted
version: "2.5.6"
shared_preferences_linux:
dependency: transitive
dependency: "direct dev"
description:
name: shared_preferences_linux
sha256: "580abfd40f415611503cae30adf626e6656dfb2f0cee8f465ece7b6defb40f2f"
+5
View File
@@ -99,6 +99,11 @@ dev_dependencies:
drift_dev: ^2.28.3
shared_preferences_platform_interface: ^2.4.0
path_provider_platform_interface: ^2.1.0
# Drives the real desktop preference backend against a temp file in tests, so
# the #1732 corrupt-store repair loop is covered on any host and not only on
# a Windows/Linux runner. Both classes expose `fs`/`pathProvider` for this.
shared_preferences_linux: ^2.4.1
path_provider_linux: ^2.2.1
plugin_platform_interface: ^2.1.0
freezed: ^3.2.5
analyzer: 10.2.0
@@ -1,8 +1,12 @@
import 'dart:async';
import 'dart:io';
import 'package:flutter_test/flutter_test.dart';
import 'package:path/path.dart' as p;
import 'package:path_provider_platform_interface/path_provider_platform_interface.dart';
import 'package:plezy/services/base_shared_preferences_service.dart';
import 'package:shared_preferences/shared_preferences.dart';
import '../test_helpers/io_fakes.dart';
import '../test_helpers/prefs.dart';
void main() {
@@ -57,4 +61,56 @@ void main() {
await cache.setString('loader', 'production');
expect(cache.getString('loader'), 'production');
});
_poisonedCacheRegression();
}
/// A repair that quarantines the store and then cannot reopen it must not
/// leave the process permanently unable to try again.
///
/// Before #1732's fix the repaired future was built straight from the cache
/// loader, bypassing the self-healing `onError` reset that `sharedCache`
/// installs. A reopen failure therefore parked a rejected future in
/// `_cacheFuture`, and every later attempt replayed that stale error for the
/// rest of the process — with the damaged file already moved aside, so a
/// restart would have booted cleanly.
void _poisonedCacheRegression() {
group('repairCorruptStore', () {
late Directory root;
late PathProviderPlatform previousPathProvider;
setUp(() async {
resetSharedPreferencesForTest();
root = await Directory.systemTemp.createTemp('plezy_repair_reopen_');
previousPathProvider = PathProviderPlatform.instance;
PathProviderPlatform.instance = FakePathProvider(root);
});
tearDown(() async {
BaseSharedPreferencesService.resetForTesting();
PathProviderPlatform.instance = previousPathProvider;
if (await root.exists()) await root.delete(recursive: true);
});
test('a reopen failure does not poison the shared cache', () async {
final support = Directory(p.join(root.path, 'support'))..createSync(recursive: true);
File(p.join(support.path, 'shared_preferences.json')).writeAsStringSync('{"theme":"dark"');
var loadCount = 0;
BaseSharedPreferencesService.setCacheLoaderForTesting(() {
loadCount++;
if (loadCount == 1) return Future<SharedPreferencesWithCache>.error(StateError('reopen failed'));
return SharedPreferencesWithCache.create(cacheOptions: const SharedPreferencesWithCacheOptions());
});
await expectLater(BaseSharedPreferencesService.repairCorruptStore(), throwsA(isA<StateError>()));
// The damaged file is already quarantined, so the next attempt has a
// clean slate and must actually be allowed to use it.
final recovered = await BaseSharedPreferencesService.sharedCache();
expect(loadCount, 2);
await recovered.setBool('recovered', true);
expect(recovered.getBool('recovered'), isTrue);
});
});
}
+111
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@@ -190,6 +190,105 @@ void main() {
throwsA(isA<CorruptPreferenceStoreException>()),
);
});
// #1732 was reported as "FormatException at offset 0" and nothing else.
// These fix which byte shapes can produce that, because the diagnostic
// deliberately discards the document and the offset is all a report has.
group('byte-level damage', () {
test('an all-zero document is rejected at offset 0', () async {
// The shape an interrupted write leaves behind when the file system
// extended the file's metadata but never flushed its contents.
await store.writeAsBytes(List<int>.filled(64, 0));
final damage = await PrefsRecovery.describeCurrentStoreDamage(reopenSafe: true, storeFileOverride: store);
expect(damage, isNotNull);
expect(damage!.causeType, 'FormatException');
expect(damage.offset, 0);
expect(damage.shape?.length, 64);
expect(damage.shape?.validUtf8, isTrue);
expect(damage.shape?.allZero, isTrue);
});
test('a leading NUL before an intact document is rejected at offset 0', () async {
await store.writeAsBytes([0, ...utf8.encode('{"$credentialVaultKeyPref":"$_validVaultKey"}')]);
final damage = await PrefsRecovery.describeCurrentStoreDamage(reopenSafe: true, storeFileOverride: store);
expect(damage?.offset, 0);
// Byte-level garbage at the front, but the entries behind it are still
// verbatim, so this is the offset-0 shape a salvage can still rescue.
expect(damage?.shape?.allZero, isFalse);
expect(PrefsRecovery.salvage(await store.readAsString()).vaultKey, _validVaultKey);
});
test('bytes that are not UTF-8 are damage, not an unreadable file', () async {
// `File.readAsString` reports this as a FileSystemException, which is
// indistinguishable from a denied or locked file — so the preflight
// used to wave it through and the app died with no Repair button.
await store.writeAsBytes([0xFF, 0xFE, ...utf8.encode('{"theme":"dark"}')]);
final damage = await PrefsRecovery.describeCurrentStoreDamage(reopenSafe: true, storeFileOverride: store);
expect(damage, isNotNull);
expect(damage!.causeType, 'FormatException');
expect(damage.shape?.validUtf8, isFalse);
await expectLater(
PrefsRecovery.assertStoreReadable(storeFileOverride: store),
throwsA(isA<CorruptPreferenceStoreException>()),
);
});
test('a UTF-8 BOM is stripped by the decoder and accepted', () async {
// Ruled out as a cause of #1732: the decoder consumes the BOM, so the
// document behind it parses and the app boots.
await store.writeAsBytes([0xEF, 0xBB, 0xBF, ...utf8.encode('{"theme":"dark"}')]);
expect(await PrefsRecovery.describeCurrentStoreDamage(reopenSafe: true, storeFileOverride: store), isNull);
});
test('a whitespace-only document fails past offset 0', () async {
// Also ruled out: the parser skips the whitespace first, so the offset
// lands at the end of the document rather than at its first byte.
await store.writeAsString(' \n');
final damage = await PrefsRecovery.describeCurrentStoreDamage(reopenSafe: true, storeFileOverride: store);
expect(damage, isNotNull);
expect(damage!.offset, isNot(0));
});
test('a structural rejection carries no offset', () async {
await store.writeAsString('{"theme":"dark","broken":null}');
final damage = await PrefsRecovery.describeCurrentStoreDamage(reopenSafe: true, storeFileOverride: store);
expect(damage?.offset, isNull);
});
test('reopenSafe and the byte shape reach the rendered message', () async {
// The whole point of carrying them: a report of this class should be
// diagnosable without asking the user for the file.
await store.writeAsBytes(List<int>.filled(8, 0));
final damage = await PrefsRecovery.describeCurrentStoreDamage(reopenSafe: false, storeFileOverride: store);
expect(damage.toString(), contains('reopenSafe: false'));
expect(damage.toString(), contains('8 bytes'));
expect(damage.toString(), contains('every byte zero'));
// Still never the document itself.
expect(damage.toString(), isNot(contains(_validVaultKey)));
});
test('an unreadable store is not classified as damage', () async {
// A denied or locked file must keep its own error and its own
// non-repairable path; offering a destructive repair for it would be
// worse than reporting it.
final missing = File('${store.parent.path}/definitely-absent.json');
expect(await PrefsRecovery.describeCurrentStoreDamage(reopenSafe: true, storeFileOverride: missing), isNull);
});
});
});
group('quarantine', () {
@@ -213,6 +312,18 @@ void main() {
expect(await File(result.backupPath!).exists(), isFalse);
});
test('salvages a store whose bytes are not valid UTF-8', () async {
// `readAsString` raises FileSystemException for a decode failure, so the
// old strict read aborted the whole repair and left the damaged store
// live — the app stayed dead with a "Repair failed" snackbar.
await store.writeAsBytes([0xFF, 0xFE, ...utf8.encode('{"$credentialVaultKeyPref":"$_validVaultKey"}')]);
final result = await PrefsRecovery.quarantine(storeFileOverride: store);
expect(await store.exists(), isFalse);
expect(result.salvaged.vaultKey, _validVaultKey);
});
});
group('backupStore', () {
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
import 'dart:convert';
import 'dart:io';
import 'package:flutter_test/flutter_test.dart';
import 'package:path/path.dart' as p;
import 'package:path_provider_linux/path_provider_linux.dart';
import 'package:path_provider_platform_interface/path_provider_platform_interface.dart';
import 'package:plezy/services/base_shared_preferences_service.dart';
import 'package:plezy/services/prefs_recovery.dart';
import 'package:plezy/services/sensitive_prefs.dart';
import 'package:plezy/services/settings_service.dart';
import 'package:shared_preferences_linux/shared_preferences_linux.dart';
import 'package:shared_preferences_platform_interface/shared_preferences_async_platform_interface.dart';
import 'package:shared_preferences_platform_interface/shared_preferences_platform_interface.dart';
import '../test_helpers/io_fakes.dart';
/// The whole #1732 loop, driven against the **real** desktop preference
/// backend rather than an in-memory fake.
///
/// The two halves of the existing coverage never met: file-level tests called
/// `PrefsRecovery` statics with a `storeFileOverride` and never built a gate,
/// while gate-level tests threw synthetic exceptions and never touched a file.
/// Every defect in #1732 lived in the join — the preflight's callsite, the
/// classification of what the plugin threw, and the reopen after a repair.
///
/// `shared_preferences_linux` is pure Dart and byte-identical to the Windows
/// implementation; both expose `fs`/`pathProvider` for exactly this. Pointing
/// its path provider at a temp directory runs the genuine read, parse, cache
/// and write code on any host.
void main() {
TestWidgetsFlutterBinding.ensureInitialized();
late Directory root;
late Directory support;
late File store;
/// A 32-byte key, the only length `AesGcm.with256bits()` accepts.
final validVaultKey = base64Encode(List<int>.generate(32, (i) => i));
setUp(() async {
root = await Directory.systemTemp.createTemp('plezy_prefs_repair_flow_');
support = Directory(p.join(root.path, 'support'))..createSync(recursive: true);
store = File(p.join(support.path, prefsStoreFileName));
PathProviderPlatform.instance = FakePathProvider(root);
// The desktop store path is Windows/Linux only; without this the preflight
// is a no-op on a macOS host and the test would assert nothing.
PrefsRecovery.debugSetSupportedPlatformOverride(true);
final pathProvider = _TempPathProviderLinux(support.path);
SharedPreferencesStorePlatform.instance = SharedPreferencesLinux()..pathProvider = pathProvider;
SharedPreferencesAsyncPlatform.instance = SharedPreferencesAsyncLinux()..pathProvider = pathProvider;
BaseSharedPreferencesService.resetForTesting();
SettingsService.resetForTesting();
// `CredentialVault` memoises the first key it sees; the repair reseeds
// before anything can read, which is what makes the reseed safe.
});
tearDown(() async {
BaseSharedPreferencesService.resetForTesting();
SettingsService.resetForTesting();
PrefsRecovery.debugSetSupportedPlatformOverride(null);
if (await root.exists()) await root.delete(recursive: true);
});
test('a store the backend can read opens normally', () async {
await store.writeAsString(jsonEncode({'theme': 'dark'}));
await expectLater(SettingsService.getInstance(), completes);
});
test('an offset-0 store fails the gate as a repairable corruption', () async {
// The exact shape reported in #1732: valid UTF-8, non-empty, and a first
// byte that is not a legal JSON value start.
await store.writeAsBytes([
0,
...utf8.encode(jsonEncode({'theme': 'dark'})),
]);
final error = await SettingsService.getInstance().then<Object?>((_) => null, onError: (Object e) => e);
expect(error, isA<CorruptPreferenceStoreException>());
final corruption = error! as CorruptPreferenceStoreException;
expect(corruption.offset, 0);
// Caught by the preflight, before either backend memoised anything, so the
// repair can reopen in this same process.
expect(corruption.reopenSafe, isTrue);
});
test('repairing an offset-0 store reopens it in the same process and keeps the vault key', () async {
await store.writeAsBytes([
0,
...utf8.encode(jsonEncode({credentialVaultKeyPref: validVaultKey, 'theme': 'dark'})),
]);
await expectLater(SettingsService.getInstance(), throwsA(isA<CorruptPreferenceStoreException>()));
final outcome = await BaseSharedPreferencesService.repairCorruptStore();
expect(outcome.vaultKeySalvaged, isTrue);
expect(outcome.requiresRestart, isFalse);
expect(outcome.backupPath, isNotNull);
expect(await File(outcome.backupPath!).exists(), isTrue);
// The point of the whole exercise: this process, no restart.
final settings = await SettingsService.getInstance();
expect(settings, isNotNull);
// The salvaged key is on disk under the async key name, so every token
// stored as ciphertext in the database stays decryptable.
final reopened = jsonDecode(await store.readAsString()) as Map<String, dynamic>;
expect(reopened[credentialVaultKeyPref], validVaultKey);
// Settings were reset, which is the cost the consent dialog names.
expect(reopened.containsKey('theme'), isFalse);
});
test('a store whose bytes are not UTF-8 is repairable, not a dead end', () async {
// `File.readAsString` reports a decode failure as FileSystemException, so
// this used to slip past the preflight, fail the type check that decides
// repairability, and reach the user as a failure screen with no Repair
// button and no way forward.
await store.writeAsBytes([
0xFF,
0xFE,
...utf8.encode(jsonEncode({credentialVaultKeyPref: validVaultKey})),
]);
final error = await SettingsService.getInstance().then<Object?>((_) => null, onError: (Object e) => e);
expect(error, isA<CorruptPreferenceStoreException>());
expect((error! as CorruptPreferenceStoreException).shape?.validUtf8, isFalse);
final outcome = await BaseSharedPreferencesService.repairCorruptStore();
expect(outcome.vaultKeySalvaged, isTrue);
await expectLater(SettingsService.getInstance(), completes);
});
test('an empty store is a first launch, not damage', () async {
// Both backends skip `json.decode` for an empty document, so rejecting it
// would brick a launch the plugin handles perfectly well.
await store.writeAsBytes(const []);
await expectLater(SettingsService.getInstance(), completes);
});
test('a genuine read failure keeps its own type and stays non-repairable', () async {
// A store the process cannot read is not a damaged *document*. Offering a
// destructive repair for a permissions problem would reset every setting
// and risk the vault key over something a chmod fixes, so the failure has
// to keep its own type and its own non-repairable path.
await store.writeAsString(jsonEncode({'theme': 'dark'}));
if (!_run('chmod', ['000', store.path])) {
// No `chmod` on a Windows PATH, and its ACL model would need a different
// probe entirely.
markTestSkipped('cannot make a file unreadable here');
return;
}
addTearDown(() => _run('chmod', ['600', store.path]));
var readable = true;
try {
store.readAsBytesSync();
} on FileSystemException {
readable = false;
}
// Running as root (some container images) defeats the mode bits entirely.
if (readable) {
markTestSkipped('the store stayed readable after chmod 000; cannot stage an I/O failure here');
return;
}
final error = await SettingsService.getInstance().then<Object?>((_) => null, onError: (Object e) => e);
expect(error, isNotNull);
expect(error, isNot(isA<CorruptPreferenceStoreException>()));
});
}
class _TempPathProviderLinux extends PathProviderLinux {
_TempPathProviderLinux(this.supportPath);
final String supportPath;
@override
Future<String?> getApplicationSupportPath() async => supportPath;
}
/// Runs a POSIX helper, reporting whether it succeeded.
///
/// Returns false rather than throwing when the binary is missing, so a Windows
/// run reaches `markTestSkipped` instead of failing the whole suite on a
/// ProcessException before the test body can decide anything.
bool _run(String executable, List<String> arguments) {
try {
return Process.runSync(executable, arguments).exitCode == 0;
} on ProcessException {
return false;
}
}