Upstream shared_preferences_windows and _linux write the whole preference
document with a bare `writeAsStringSync`. That opens with the default
`FileMode.write`, which truncates the live file before writing it, so every
single preference write has a window in which the only copy on disk is empty
or half-written. A crash, power loss, forced reboot or antivirus interception
inside that window leaves a document that fails to parse on every subsequent
launch — and the store holds the credential-vault key, so the loss is not
recoverable by rewriting it. This is the corruption class behind #1732; the
recovery path already landed is a band-aid over it.
Vendor both packages under packages/ — the convention saf_util and
wakelock_plus already follow — and stage, flush, then rename over the target.
The flush has to precede the rename or it could publish contents that were
never committed, the same corruption by another route. Staging uses one fixed
sibling name rather than a stamped one, because the file is a plaintext copy
of the vault key, tracker refresh tokens and Seerr cookies; it is created in
the target's own directory so rename stays on one volume and the mode matches
what the canonical file would have had, and a stale one is swept once the
canonical document has been read cleanly. Both deltas are marked in-source and
in provenance.json with the refresh contract.
Atomicity is proven, not asserted. A hard link to the store observes the old
document after a write, which only holds when the directory entry was replaced
— truncate-in-place would have rewritten the shared inode, and that test does
fail against unpatched upstream. Upstream's own suites still pass unchanged in
both packages and now run in CI, so the patch keeps the contract it inherited.
Windows `MoveFileExW` replacement semantics cannot be proven on a POSIX runner
or a memory file system, so they get their own test on the existing
windows-latest job, including replacement while a reader holds the file open —
antivirus and Search Indexer both do.
`File.readAsString` reports a UTF-8 decode failure as a FileSystemException,
not a FormatException, so three guards written for that case never ran. The
preflight's `on FormatException` branch was unreachable and its
`on FileSystemException` sibling waved the document through; the plugin then
threw the same FileSystemException, which failed the FormatException/TypeError
test that decides repairability; and quarantine's lossy-decode fallback sat
dead behind a rethrow. A store with one bad high byte — a UTF-16 BOM, a stray
0x80 — therefore reached the user as a failure screen with no Repair button
and no way forward at all.
Read bytes and decode explicitly instead, at both sites. Classification moves
into describeStoreDamage, so a failure that surfaces after the preflight
passed is judged by re-reading the file rather than by the error's type: a
denied or locked store is indistinguishable from a decode failure by type or
message, and offering a destructive repair for a permissions problem would
reset every setting and risk the vault key over something a chmod fixes.
isCorruptStoreError went with it, having no remaining callers.
A repair that quarantines the store and then cannot reopen it no longer
strands the process either. The repaired future was built straight from the
cache loader, bypassing the self-healing reset sharedCache installs, so a
failed reopen parked a rejected future in _cacheFuture and every later attempt
replayed that stale error — with the damaged file already moved aside, so a
restart would have booted cleanly.
CorruptPreferenceStoreException now carries reopenSafe and a derived,
content-free shape: byte length, whether it decoded, whether every byte is
zero. #1732 arrived as "FormatException at offset 0" and nothing else, which
cannot separate an all-zero file from a non-JSON first character from bytes
that are not UTF-8; these can, and never quote the document.
Cover the loop against the real desktop backend rather than a fake.
shared_preferences_linux is pure Dart, byte-identical to the Windows
implementation, and exposes fs/pathProvider, so pointing it at a temp
directory exercises the genuine read, parse, cache and write path on any host
— the join between preflight, classification and reopen where every one of
these defects lived, and which had no coverage at all.
close#1496
Bumps os_media_controls so the audio session is only activated on
playing-state pushes; paused/metadata pushes no longer re-interrupt
other apps' audio (which caused the 1-2 Hz play/pause loop).
Pulls edde746/media_controls@71b96f8: iOS/macOS guard async artwork
downloads against track changes (slow art no longer lands on the next
track) and clear stale artwork when a track has none.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bumps os_media_controls to 4f4b28f3: MediaStyle foreground service with
a JUnit-tested promote/demote/stop policy, artwork URL download (also
fixes video lock-screen art), and task-removal teardown that can't leak
orphan notifications. The music service opts into background mode per
session and requests POST_NOTIFICATIONS before first playback.
INetworkListManagerEvents Advise fails with
RPC_E_CANTCALLOUT_ININPUTSYNCCALL when the platform thread is inside an
input-synchronous call at subscribe time, and an OnListen error can
only surface in Dart as an uncatchable fatal FlutterError. The fork now
retries the registration via a message-loop timer and reports only
persistent failures through the event sink, where stream onError
handlers observe them.
saf_util 2.0.0 leaves an already-answered MethodChannel.Result behind
in pendingResult: unrelated activity request codes consume (and answer)
the pending picker, and a failed picker launch replies without clearing
the pending state. The next delivery for request 1001 then replies a
second time — IllegalStateException "Reply already submitted" in
MainActivity.onActivityResult, crashing the process.
Vendored at packages/saf_util (BSD-3) with take-and-clear reply
ownership, request codes scoped to the plugin's own pickers, and a
guarded reply on the teardown race.
Dual-stack hostnames with unreachable IPv6 stalled past the endpoint
probe budget because WinHTTP tries addresses sequentially. Enable
WINHTTP_OPTION_IPV6_FAST_FALLBACK (Happy Eyeballs) via win_http 0.2.2
so IPv4 is raced after the IPv6 attempt, matching curl/Cronet/NSURLSession.
close#1128
Replace session ID + PIN auth with HKDF-derived home secret and
per-session AES-256-GCM encrypted channel. Auto-start remote server
on host devices, auto-discover hosts via authenticated UDP broadcast.
edde746