69fadc220d68cbe84cbceef66900aa62651a8fac
3
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 edde746
|
957711a650 |
fix(startup): lead the damaged-store screen with the repair, not retry
A reporter on #1732 ran three successive builds against a preference store of 10336 bytes, every one of them zero, and reported each as "still failing". The gate classified it correctly every time and the consented repair would have cleared it in-process, but nothing on the failure screen said so: Retry was first, styled `FilledButton`, and autofocused, while `Repair storage` sat beside it as a tonal afterthought. Retry re-reads the same document, so for a corrupt-store failure it is an action that cannot succeed however many times it is pressed — and it was the one the screen recommended. Repair now takes the primary styling, the focus node and first position whenever it is offered, and the body text says plainly that retrying will not help. Retry keeps its place for every other failure, where a locked database or a denied directory really can change between attempts. The consent dialog was also promising an outcome it could not always deliver. Servers and profiles survive a repair only because their tokens are ciphertext in the database and the key that decrypts them lives in the store, so a store the key cannot be read out of signs the user out of everything — exactly the all-zero case. `PrefsRecovery.previewSalvage` reads the damaged file without touching it, and the dialog now names the real cost from that. The retained copy is labelled as holding credentials unless the bytes prove otherwise: what the salvage recovered says nothing about what the file still contains, because a store truncated mid-value keeps most of a vault key in plaintext while the salvage pattern — which needs the value's closing quote — matches nothing at all. Only an all-zero file drops the warning, so the one case that cries wolf is the one that provably holds no secret. `describe()` finally carries whether a repair was on offer. That line is the difference between a report a maintainer can act on and two days of guessing whether the button was even on screen. close #1732 |
||
|
edde746
|
3ae7aa554b |
fix(prefs): recover a preference store whose bytes are not valid UTF-8
`File.readAsString` reports a UTF-8 decode failure as a FileSystemException, not a FormatException, so three guards written for that case never ran. The preflight's `on FormatException` branch was unreachable and its `on FileSystemException` sibling waved the document through; the plugin then threw the same FileSystemException, which failed the FormatException/TypeError test that decides repairability; and quarantine's lossy-decode fallback sat dead behind a rethrow. A store with one bad high byte — a UTF-16 BOM, a stray 0x80 — therefore reached the user as a failure screen with no Repair button and no way forward at all. Read bytes and decode explicitly instead, at both sites. Classification moves into describeStoreDamage, so a failure that surfaces after the preflight passed is judged by re-reading the file rather than by the error's type: a denied or locked store is indistinguishable from a decode failure by type or message, and offering a destructive repair for a permissions problem would reset every setting and risk the vault key over something a chmod fixes. isCorruptStoreError went with it, having no remaining callers. A repair that quarantines the store and then cannot reopen it no longer strands the process either. The repaired future was built straight from the cache loader, bypassing the self-healing reset sharedCache installs, so a failed reopen parked a rejected future in _cacheFuture and every later attempt replayed that stale error — with the damaged file already moved aside, so a restart would have booted cleanly. CorruptPreferenceStoreException now carries reopenSafe and a derived, content-free shape: byte length, whether it decoded, whether every byte is zero. #1732 arrived as "FormatException at offset 0" and nothing else, which cannot separate an all-zero file from a non-JSON first character from bytes that are not UTF-8; these can, and never quote the document. Cover the loop against the real desktop backend rather than a fake. shared_preferences_linux is pure Dart, byte-identical to the Windows implementation, and exposes fs/pathProvider, so pointing it at a temp directory exercises the genuine read, parse, cache and write path on any host — the join between preflight, classification and reopen where every one of these defects lived, and which had no coverage at all. |
||
|
edde746
|
7f0cad339c |
fix(startup): report and repair a failed launch instead of showing "Error"
Since 2.10.0 the whole app sits behind one all-or-nothing initialization gate, and that gate discarded the only evidence of its own failure. It caught the error, logged nothing but `error.runtimeType`, rendered an icon plus the word "Error" plus Retry, and never reported the error because catching it kept the crash reporter from ever seeing it. There is no log file on any platform, the buffer is in memory only, a double-clicked Windows release build has no console, and the log viewer lives in Settings, behind the gate that just failed. #1732 is the result: a Windows 11 user whose app will not boot and who cannot produce a single byte of diagnostic detail. The gate now names its phases. Each step is wrapped so a throw carries the phase it came from, replacing a `Future.wait` that discarded every error but the first and could not attribute it to any of four concurrent steps. The failure screen renders the phase, the exception type, the message and an expandable stack, plus copy and upload actions that reuse the existing log-relay flow. The record is persisted next to the database so the next successful launch can surface it in Settings > Logs, and it is reported to the crash reporter explicitly. Only preferences and the database still gate the launch. Window chrome, locale, crash-reporting init, TV/performance detection, the image-cache budget and download storage are best-effort and time-bounded, so a stalled platform thread degrades instead of holding the splash forever. Sentry no longer receives the startup work as its `appRunner`: that made a startup failure indistinguishable from a Sentry failure, and the guard would then have re-run migrations and the database open a second time. The two remaining fatal steps become recoverable. Preference reads tolerate a value whose stored type no longer matches, dropping the key and defaulting instead of failing the boot. A store that cannot be parsed is detected before either desktop plugin backend can memoise it, which is what makes an in-process repair possible at all. Repair is never automatic: it states what it will cost, salvages the credential-vault key and every tracker and Seerr session it can validate out of the damaged bytes, reseeds them, and moves the original aside rather than deleting it. Servers and profiles survive a salvaged key because their tokens are ciphertext in the database; tracker and Seerr sessions are plaintext preference entries, so the copy says they may still need reconnecting. Nothing derived from the store reaches a diagnostic. `FormatException` prints an excerpt of whatever it failed to parse, and during startup that document holds the vault key, refresh tokens and session cookies while the redaction manager still has nothing registered, so the wrapper keeps only the cause's type and offset and the record is an allowlist of already-redacted fields. The quarantined copy is labelled as containing credentials, is never offered for upload, and can be deleted from the dialog. Also self-heals orphaned WAL/SHM sidecars on desktop rather than only tvOS, makes every `createTable` migration step idempotent, keeps MSVC link by-products out of the Windows bundle, and asserts bundle contents in CI. Refs #1732 |