A failed MAC check (key/ciphertext divergence: restored backup, clobbered prefs, racing key generation across isolates) threw from CredentialVault.reveal on the startup profile-settings path and crash-looped the app until data was wiped — one device logged 31 fatals in 16 minutes on 2.8.0. Decrypt failure now means the credential is lost, never a crash: reveal() returns null, ProfileConnectionRegistry maps it onto the existing empty-token lazy-fetch sentinel and heals the row so later boots re-acquire the token instead of re-failing, and revealConnectionConfig degrades tokens to empty strings without marking them migrated. Key init also reloads prefs before deciding to generate and re-reads after writing, adopting whatever landed so all isolates converge on a single key instead of orphaning ciphertext.
174 lines
6.6 KiB
Dart
174 lines
6.6 KiB
Dart
import 'dart:convert';
|
|
import 'dart:math';
|
|
|
|
import 'package:cryptography/cryptography.dart';
|
|
import 'package:flutter/foundation.dart' show visibleForTesting;
|
|
|
|
import '../utils/app_logger.dart';
|
|
import 'base_shared_preferences_service.dart';
|
|
|
|
/// Encrypts credentials before they are persisted in Drift config/token
|
|
/// columns. The database no longer stores raw server tokens; registries
|
|
/// decrypt at their boundaries and rewrite legacy plaintext values on read.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Security model: the key is stored in SharedPreferences, so this is
|
|
/// obfuscation-at-rest against casual database inspection/export rather than
|
|
/// OS-backed Keychain/Keystore protection. Anyone with full access to both app
|
|
/// prefs and the database can recover the tokens.
|
|
class CredentialVault {
|
|
CredentialVault._();
|
|
|
|
static const String _keyPref = 'credential_vault_key_v1';
|
|
static const String _prefix = 'enc:v1:';
|
|
static final AesGcm _algorithm = AesGcm.with256bits();
|
|
static Future<SecretKey>? _secretKey;
|
|
|
|
/// Drops the memoized key so tests can simulate key loss/divergence.
|
|
@visibleForTesting
|
|
static void resetKeyForTesting() {
|
|
_secretKey = null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool isProtected(String? value) => value != null && value.startsWith(_prefix);
|
|
|
|
static Future<String> protect(String value) async {
|
|
if (value.isEmpty || isProtected(value)) return value;
|
|
final key = await _getSecretKey();
|
|
final box = await _algorithm.encrypt(utf8.encode(value), secretKey: key);
|
|
return '$_prefix${jsonEncode({'n': base64Encode(box.nonce), 'c': base64Encode(box.cipherText), 'm': base64Encode(box.mac.bytes)})}';
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Decrypts a protected value, or returns it unchanged when it isn't
|
|
/// protected. Returns null when decryption fails — a failed MAC check
|
|
/// (key/ciphertext divergence: restored backup, clobbered prefs, racing
|
|
/// key generation) or a corrupt payload means the credential is *lost*,
|
|
/// never a reason to crash; callers treat null as "re-acquire the token".
|
|
static Future<String?> reveal(String value) async {
|
|
if (!isProtected(value)) return value;
|
|
try {
|
|
final payload = jsonDecode(value.substring(_prefix.length)) as Map<String, dynamic>;
|
|
final box = SecretBox(
|
|
base64Decode(payload['c'] as String),
|
|
nonce: base64Decode(payload['n'] as String),
|
|
mac: Mac(base64Decode(payload['m'] as String)),
|
|
);
|
|
final clear = await _algorithm.decrypt(box, secretKey: await _getSecretKey());
|
|
return utf8.decode(clear);
|
|
} catch (e) {
|
|
appLogger.w('CredentialVault: failed to decrypt stored credential, treating as lost', error: e);
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static Future<Map<String, Object?>> protectConnectionConfig(String kind, Map<String, Object?> config) async {
|
|
final copy = Map<String, Object?>.from(config);
|
|
final tokenKey = switch (kind) {
|
|
'plex' => 'accountToken',
|
|
'jellyfin' => 'accessToken',
|
|
_ => null,
|
|
};
|
|
final token = tokenKey == null ? null : copy[tokenKey];
|
|
if (token is String) copy[tokenKey!] = await protect(token);
|
|
if (kind == 'plex') {
|
|
copy['servers'] = await _protectPlexServers(copy['servers']);
|
|
}
|
|
return copy;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static Future<({Map<String, dynamic> config, bool migrated})> revealConnectionConfig(
|
|
String kind,
|
|
Map<String, dynamic> config,
|
|
) async {
|
|
final copy = Map<String, dynamic>.from(config);
|
|
final tokenKey = switch (kind) {
|
|
'plex' => 'accountToken',
|
|
'jellyfin' => 'accessToken',
|
|
_ => null,
|
|
};
|
|
var migrated = false;
|
|
final token = tokenKey == null ? null : copy[tokenKey];
|
|
if (token is String && token.isNotEmpty) {
|
|
final revealed = await reveal(token);
|
|
// An undecryptable token becomes the empty string — the shared
|
|
// "no credential, re-auth" shape — and must not be rewritten back.
|
|
migrated = revealed != null && !isProtected(token);
|
|
copy[tokenKey!] = revealed ?? '';
|
|
}
|
|
if (kind == 'plex') {
|
|
final result = await _revealPlexServers(copy['servers']);
|
|
copy['servers'] = result.servers;
|
|
migrated = migrated || result.migrated;
|
|
}
|
|
return (config: copy, migrated: migrated);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static Future<Object?> _protectPlexServers(Object? rawServers) async {
|
|
if (rawServers is! List) return rawServers;
|
|
final servers = <Object?>[];
|
|
for (final raw in rawServers) {
|
|
if (raw is! Map) {
|
|
servers.add(raw);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
final server = Map<String, Object?>.from(raw);
|
|
final token = server['accessToken'];
|
|
if (token is String) server['accessToken'] = await protect(token);
|
|
servers.add(server);
|
|
}
|
|
return servers;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static Future<({Object? servers, bool migrated})> _revealPlexServers(Object? rawServers) async {
|
|
if (rawServers is! List) return (servers: rawServers, migrated: false);
|
|
var migrated = false;
|
|
final servers = <Object?>[];
|
|
for (final raw in rawServers) {
|
|
if (raw is! Map) {
|
|
servers.add(raw);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
final server = Map<String, dynamic>.from(raw);
|
|
final token = server['accessToken'];
|
|
if (token is String && token.isNotEmpty) {
|
|
final revealed = await reveal(token);
|
|
migrated = migrated || (revealed != null && !isProtected(token));
|
|
server['accessToken'] = revealed ?? '';
|
|
}
|
|
servers.add(server);
|
|
}
|
|
return (servers: servers, migrated: migrated);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static Future<SecretKey> _getSecretKey() {
|
|
return _secretKey ??= () async {
|
|
final prefs = await BaseSharedPreferencesService.sharedCache();
|
|
// The cached snapshot can predate a key written by another isolate
|
|
// (background downloader, first-run migration); generating "fresh" over
|
|
// it would clobber the real key and orphan every stored ciphertext.
|
|
// Reload before deciding, and after writing re-read and adopt whatever
|
|
// actually landed so all isolates converge on a single key.
|
|
try {
|
|
await prefs.reloadCache();
|
|
} catch (e) {
|
|
appLogger.d('CredentialVault: prefs reload before key check failed', error: e);
|
|
}
|
|
final stored = prefs.getString(_keyPref);
|
|
if (stored != null && stored.isNotEmpty) {
|
|
return SecretKey(base64Decode(stored));
|
|
}
|
|
final bytes = List<int>.generate(32, (_) => Random.secure().nextInt(256));
|
|
await prefs.setString(_keyPref, base64Encode(bytes));
|
|
try {
|
|
await prefs.reloadCache();
|
|
final settled = prefs.getString(_keyPref);
|
|
if (settled != null && settled.isNotEmpty) {
|
|
return SecretKey(base64Decode(settled));
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (e) {
|
|
appLogger.d('CredentialVault: prefs re-read after key write failed', error: e);
|
|
}
|
|
return SecretKey(bytes);
|
|
}();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|